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Abstract
Every international and hybrid war crimes court has attracted a measure of controversy, but none more than the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC). While myriad aspects of the ECCC’s record are crucial to its legacy, this
article explores one question of overarching importance: whether its performance has
justified a key risk the UN assumed when it agreed to support the court — that case
selection would be improperly influenced by the Cambodian government. More particularly, it assesses the ECCC’s performance in light of two questions: How well
have safeguards against political interference worked? Are survivors of Khmer Rouge
atrocities and other Cambodian citizens satisfied with ECCC justice? Along with their
intrinsic importance, these benchmarks for assessment derive from the primacy of
both considerations in deliberations leading to the Court’s creation.

1. Introduction
Every international war crimes court1 has attracted controversy, but none
more than the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).
Now in its twilight years, the ECCC has sparked robust debate since the late
1990s, before it was even launched. During negotiations aimed at creating a
tribunal to address crimes of the Khmer Rouge, United Nations (UN) officials
and others debated whether a court acceptable to Cambodia would be worthy
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2. Genesis of an Idea and Impetus for Planning
As a foundation for this assessment, it is necessary to recall key factors that led
to the ECCC’s creation. While much of this history has been recounted elsewhere, this section highlights a factor that is often obscured, and which is
fundamental to this article’s assessment: crucial impetus was provided by
Cambodian citizens’ increasingly urgent demand for justice.

2 The quoted phrase comes from the report of a Group of Experts whom the UN SecretaryGeneral appointed to assess the feasibility of and legal options for prosecuting Khmer Rouge
suspects. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 52/135, UN Doc. A/53/850-S/1999/231, Annex, 16 March 1999, § 101 (hereafter
‘Group of Experts Report’). See also S. Mydans, ‘11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Worth It?’ New York Times, 10 April 2017. For a positive assessment of the performance and legacy of the ECCC, see in this symposium, P. Lobba and N. Pons,
‘Rethinking the Legacy of the ECCC: Selectivity, Accountability, Ownership’.
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of UN support. Today, the fulcrum of debate is whether the ECCC was ‘worth
the effort’ it has required.2
While myriad aspects of the ECCC’s record are crucial to its legacy, this
article explores one question of overarching importance: whether the Court’s
performance has justified a central risk the UN assumed when it agreed to
support the Court — that case selection would be improperly influenced by the
Cambodian government. More particularly, it assesses performance against two
criteria: How well have safeguards against political interference worked? Are
survivors of Khmer Rouge atrocities and other Cambodian citizens satisfied
with ECCC justice?
Along with their intrinsic importance, these benchmarks for assessment
derive from the primacy of both considerations in deliberations leading to
the Court’s creation. Over the course of fraught negotiations about a possible
Khmer Rouge tribunal, concerns about government interference loomed large
in the concerns of UN officials and others. As noted, that risk was especially
pronounced with respect to case selection. Ultimately, the UN and Cambodia
agreed to include in the Court’s legal framework novel safeguards against
such interference, but UN negotiators remained sceptical about their
sufficiency.
While several factors led the UN to support the ECCC despite its concerns,
one had overarching importance: the opportunity to provide justice to victims
of Khmer Rouge atrocities could soon disappear. This consideration was amply
warranted for reasons that transcend the advanced age of likely suspects. As
elaborated later, there are few goals a war crimes court is better suited to
achieve than providing justice to those who survived crimes of surpassing
cruelty and scope.
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A. Origins of Planning Efforts

3 See C. Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice: Law, Politics, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunals (Columbia
University Press, 2019), at 259. Khmer Rouge atrocities have been widely documented and
analysed. See e.g. B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under
the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979 (Yale University Press, 1996); D.P. Chandler, The Tragedy of
Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (Yale University Press, 1991); E.
Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution (Public Affairs,
1998).
4 The Vietnamese army, along with Cambodian resistance forces, launched a full-scale invasion of
Cambodia on 24 December 1978, and installed in power what was then an opposition group in
early January 1979.
5 See A.L. Hinton, The Justice Façade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia (Oxford University Press,
2018), at 45; S. Heder and B. Tittemore (eds), Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for
the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge (Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004), at 3, note 3; H.
Horsington, ‘The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal’, 5
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2004) 462–482, at 466–467; Group of Experts Report,
supra note 2, § 43. This view received judicial validation in Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89
Preliminary Objections (Ne bis in idem and Amnesty and Pardon), Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002),
E51/15, Trial Chamber, 3 November 2011, § 30 (1979 proceedings were so deficient as to
render the judgment without legal effect). The 1979 trial, which was broadcast nationally on
radio, nevertheless struck a resonant chord with many Cambodians. See Hinton, ibid., at 46.
6 The reasons have been widely addressed elsewhere. See e.g. Group of Experts Report, supra note
2, § 43; S. Heder, The Personal Jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia as Regards Khmer Rouge ‘Senior Leaders’ and Others ‘Most Responsible’ for Khmer
Rouge Crimes: A History and Recent Developments, 26 April 2012, available online at www.
cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/A%20Review%20of%20the%20Negotiations%20Leading%
20to%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Personal%20Jurisdiction%20of%20the%20ECCC.
pdf (visited 25 April 2020), at 5–6. Before the question of international prosecutions was seriously
pursued, there were efforts to persuade a state to bring a case before the International Court of
Justice alleging that Cambodia had breached the Genocide Convention. See Etcheson, supra note
3, at 31–34; H. Hannum, ‘International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence’,
11 Human Rights Quarterly (1989) 82–138.
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Early steps toward establishing a Khmer Rouge tribunal emerged less from
survivors’ expectations than the prevailing Zeitgeist. In a decade that saw
the creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, planning for a
permanent international criminal court, unprecedented use of universal jurisdiction, and other efforts to bring to justice those responsible for atrocious
crimes, it was natural to ask, ‘What about Cambodia?’ After all, an estimated
1.7–2.2 million Cambodians died at the hands of the Communist Party of
Kampuchea (CPK), widely known as the Khmer Rouge, when it ruled
Cambodia from April 1975 until January 1979.3
To be sure, two senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), as the Khmer
Rouge renamed Cambodia, had already been tried. In 1979, the government
then recently installed by Vietnam4 held a five-day trial in absentia of Khmer
Rouge leader Pol Pot and DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, convicting both of
genocide and sentencing them to death. But the procedure is widely considered
a show trial.5 Even so, it would take years before the international community
seriously pursued credible prosecutions for Khmer Rouge atrocities.6
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7 22 U.S.C. 2656, Part D.
8 Ibid., § 572(b)(1)–(2).
9 See Heder, supra note 6, at 9–12. Khmer Rouge forces had been fighting the Cambodian
government from bases on the Thai-Cambodian border since early 1979.
10 See S. Mydans, ‘An Amnesty in Cambodia’, New York Times, 18 September 1996. Later, the
ECCC ruled that neither the 1979 trial nor the 1996 pardon barred Ieng Sary’s prosecution.
Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections, supra note 5.
11 See R. Gidley, Illiberal Transitional Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (Springer Nature, 2019), at 80; T. Hammarberg, ‘How the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Was Agreed: Discussions between the Cambodian Government and the UN, Part I’ (2001),
available online at www.d.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/How_Khmer_Rouge_Tribunal.htm
(subsequent pinpoint references are based on a hard copy printed from this link; visited 25
April 2020); ‘Peace, Then Justice in Cambodia (editorial)’, New York Times, 17 August 1996.
12 S. Mydans, ‘Cambodia’s Dual Premiers Are Split on Khmer Rouge’, New York Times, 21 August
1996. Soon, however, the two joined in seeking the amnesty. See S. Mydans, ‘Cambodians to
Seek Amnesty for Khmer Rouge Defector’, New York Times, 24 August 1996; ‘Khmer Rouge
Amnesty Announced by Sihanouk’, New York Times, 25 August 1996.
13 S. Mydans, ‘Why Cambodia May Overlook Its Past’, New York Times, 8 September 1996. Some
contemporaneous media accounts did, however, reflect Cambodian opposition to the amnesty.
See e.g. ‘Cambodia Grants Amnesty to Breakaway Khmer Rouge Leader’, Morning Edition,
National Public Radio, 16 September 1996; A. Fifield, ‘Peace without Justice’, In These Times,
23 December 1996.
14 Y. Chhang, ‘The Thief of History — Cambodia and the Special Court’, 1 International Journal of
Transitional Justice (IJTJ) (2007) 157–172, at 162.
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The first significant governmental steps toward such a process were taken in
Washington. In 1994, the US Congress enacted the Cambodian Genocide
Justice Act,7 which urged the President to collect or assist others to collect
evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities and support a tribunal to hold those responsible to account.8 The Act might have been quietly buried in bureaucratic
indifference were it not for a determined State Department official, David
Scheffer, who pressed relentlessly for a Khmer Rouge tribunal.
In mid-1996, developments in Cambodia drew wider attention to the question whether Khmer Rouge leaders should face a judicial reckoning. After
negotiating the defection to government forces of several remnant Khmer
Rouge units once associated with Ieng Sary, then-Co-Prime Minister Hun
Sen persuaded Ieng Sary to return from exile and act as leader of the defecting
units, thus signalling an unravelling of the old DK leadership.9 In August, Hun
Sen prevailed upon King Norodom Sihanouk to grant Ieng Sary a pardon from
his 1979 conviction and amnesty from prosecution under a 1994 law outlawing the Khmer Rouge.10 Far from taking prosecutions off the table, however, the amnesty triggered robust debate in Cambodia and abroad.11 Within
the government, the prospect of welcoming Ieng Sary ‘back into society’ divided the two co-prime ministers, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen.12
As for Cambodian citizens, the influential New York Times reported that
many seemed ‘to prefer not to reopen old wounds’, and were instead ‘more
eager for peace than for retribution’.13 In fact, however, the amnesty ‘created
a huge outcry from survivors of Democratic Kampuchea and forced the issue of
justice for the regime’s crimes to the fore’.14

Assessing the Khmer Rouge Tribunal

619

B. The Arrest and Death of Pol Pot
In June 1997, Stephen Heder, one of the foremost scholars of Cambodia, called
to share stunning news: a faction of the Khmer Rouge led by Ta Mok, formerly
CPK Second Deputy Secretary, had rebelled against Pol Pot, whom the dissidents now held on the Thai-Cambodian border.18 This faction indicated it was
willing to turn Pol Pot over to a government that was prepared to try him.
Might the US government be willing and able to respond to their offer?19 I
immediately conveyed this to Scheffer, who mounted a concerted effort to
identify: (1) a way to extract Pol Pot from Cambodia, and (2) a government
that had a legal basis for arresting Pol Pot for atrocities in Cambodia and that
was willing to detain him, at least until an international court could be
established.20
Pol Pot’s arrest also energized UN efforts to create a Khmer Rouge tribunal.21 Formally, those efforts were prompted by a letter dated 21 June 1997
from Cambodia’s two co-prime ministers to then-UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan requesting ‘the assistance of the United Nations and the international
15 In November 1996, the UN human rights office in Cambodia formulated suggestions for
Hammarberg concerning the position he might take in response to the amnesty for Ieng
Sary. See Heder, supra note 6, at 12.
16 See Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 2; M. Baaz, ‘Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Trial: An
Extraordinary Experiment in International Criminal Law’, in P. Wahlgren (ed.), Comparative
Law, Vol. 61 (Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2015) 291–338, at 298–299.
17 C.H.R. Res. 1997/49, § 12, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/49, 11 April 1997.
18 Mok’s rebellion was pre-emptive: Pol Pot had just ordered the execution of another senior
Khmer Rouge leader, Son Sen. With justification, Mok feared that Pol Pot would order his
execution next. See Heder, supra note 6, at 13.
19 The faction that arrested Pol Pot wanted a ‘concrete, guaranteed’ judicial venue before it would
surrender him. See S. Heder and D. Orentlicher, ‘The Myths that Keep Pol Pot Out of a
Courtroom’, L.A. Times, 10 August 1997. My undated notes from one conversation with
Heder during this period record that Pol Pot’s captors repeatedly asked Heder’s interlocutors:
‘Where’s the plane [to take Pol Pot away]? Where’s the court?’
20 For a detailed account of these efforts, see D. Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of
the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012), 345 et seq.; Etcheson, supra note 3,
at 48-51.
21 See S. Mydans, ‘Cambodia’s Bureaucracy of Death: Reams of Evidence in Search of a Trial’, New
York Times, 20 July 1997. Several weeks after Pol Pot’s capture, the Khmer Rouge faction
holding him announced it had condemned Pol Pot ‘and his clique to life imprisonment’. ‘Khmer
Rouge Sentence Pol Pot to Life in Jail’, Washington Post, 27 July 1997. See also N. Thayer,
‘Brother Number Zero’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 August 1997, 14–18, at 14–15.
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The amnesty also galvanized attention within the UN. Not long after Ieng
Sary’s defection, Thomas Hammarberg, who had recently become Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia,
began pressing for accountability.15 At his initiative,16 in April 1997, the UN
Human Rights Commission asked the Secretary-General to ‘examine any request by Cambodia for assistance in responding to past serious violations of
Cambodian and international law’.17
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22 Letter dated 21 June 1997 from the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia addressed to the
Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/51/930-S/1997/488, 24 June 1997, Annex. Although signed by
the co-prime ministers, the letter was suggested by Hammarberg, whom Prince Ranariddh
asked to draft it. See Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 2. The text was drafted by staff of the
UN human rights field office in Phnom Penh. See Heder, supra note 6, at 14; Etcheson, supra
note 3, at 45. Brad Adams, who took the lead in drafting the letter, would later become a
prominent critic of the ECCC in his capacity as Asia Director of Human Rights Watch.
23 See S. Mydans, ‘Hun Sen Declares Victory in Cambodia’, International Herald Tribune, 7 July
1997; T. Rosenberg, ‘Hun Sen Stages an Election’, New York Times Magazine, 30 August 1998,
26, at 26. In 1993, Prince Ranariddh’s party won UN-organized elections but Hun Sen challenged the results and threatened to renew civil war. To avert this, King Norodom Sihanouk
helped broker an arrangement pursuant to which Hun Sen and Ranariddh would share power
as co-prime ministers.
24 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Mr
Thomas Hammarberg, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 1997/49, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/1999/95, 20 February 1998, § 75.
25 GA Res. 52/135, 12 December 1997, § 16. In September 1997, Hammarberg confirmed that
Hun Sen and Ranariddh still considered the June 1997 letter valid. See Hammarberg, supra
note 11, at 4.
26 See K.B. Richburg, ‘Pol Pot’s World Ended with a Whimper’, Washington Post, 23 April 1998.
27 See R. Birsel, ‘‘‘Pol Pot’s Men Should Be Tried’’, U.N. Official Says’, Reuters, 17 April 1998; S.
Erlanger, ‘Death of Pol Pot: The Inner Circle; U.S. Wants to Try Khmer Rouge Leaders’, New
York Times, 18 April 1998; E. Becker, ‘Pol Pot’s End Won’t Stop U.S. Pursuit of His Circle’, New
York Times, 17 April 1998.
28 S. Mydans, ‘The Demons of a Despot’, New York Times, 17 April 1998.
29 R.D. McFadden, ‘Survivor of Killing Fields Is Resolute in Quest for Justice’, New York Times, 17
April 1998, quoting Dith Pran.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/18/3/615/5857808 by American University Law Library user on 26 October 2020

community in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide
and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975
to 1979’. Asserting Cambodia lacked ‘the resources and expertise to conduct
this very important procedure’ and alluding to the ad hoc Tribunals the UN
Security Council had established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the
leaders asked ‘that similar assistance be given to Cambodia’.22
The letter marked a rare and fleeting accord between the co-prime ministers.
In early July, then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen mounted a coup against
then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh.23 While efforts to create a tribunal lost momentum as a result, Hammarberg continued to advance UN
deliberations. At his initiative,24 the UN General Assembly asked the
Secretary-General to examine Cambodia’s request for assistance and suggested
that, to this end, he appoint ‘a group of experts to evaluate the existing evidence and propose further measures’ of accountability.25 Six months later, Pol
Pot died.26
Far from ending the quest for DK-era justice, Pol Pot’s death breathed new
life into efforts to ensure a legal reckoning.27 Of crucial importance, the reaction of many Cambodians ‘seemed to belie’ the view — previously popularized
in Western media — that most preferred to avoid a trial ‘in . . . a spirit of
Buddhist forgiveness’.28 As one Cambodian told the New York Times, ‘the
Jewish people’s search for justice did not end with the death of Hitler, and
the Cambodian people’s search for justice doesn’t end with Pol Pot’.29
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3. A Compromise/d Court
A. Foundational Battles: Controlling Appointments to the Court
The seeds of the most vexing controversies associated with the ECCC were
planted during those negotiations. A major point of contention was the nature
of the court — whether, that is, it would be fundamentally international or
domestic. Presciently, the Group of Experts appointed by Annan warned that
endemic corruption in Cambodia’s legal system ‘and the routine subjection of
judicial decisions to political influence would make it nearly impossible’ for key
30 Group of Experts Report, supra note 2, § 94.
31 S. Mydans, ‘2 Key Aides of Pol Pot Said to Emerge from Hiding’, New York Times, 27 December
1998.
32 S. Mydans, ‘Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge’, New York Times, 29
December 1998.
33 Ibid.
34 Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 10. Hun Sen claimed Cambodia was ready to try Mok in a
national court; outsiders would be welcome to observe those proceedings — if, that is, the
Cambodian court invited them. Ibid.
35 See L. McGrew, ‘The Thorny Debate on Justice for Pol Pot’s Madness’, Phnom Penh Post, 18
February 2000 (a majority of Cambodians participating in then-recent survey ‘felt strongly
there should be a trial’ for DK-era atrocities).
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The report of a Group of Experts appointed by Annan to explore the feasibility of and legal options for bringing key Khmer Rouge figures to justice,
submitted on 22 February 1999, put to rest any lingering notion that few
Cambodians sought justice for DK-era crimes. While acknowledging that systematic polling had not been undertaken on the subject, the experts heard ‘an
unambiguous demand for trials’ during consultations in Cambodia.30
Cambodians’ demand for justice helped ensure that the UN, as well as other
key actors, would find a way to surmount myriad obstacles to the creation of a
Khmer Rouge tribunal. Foremost among them was Hun Sen’s waning appetite
for trials. When two senior DK leaders, Khieu Samphân and Nuon Chea,
defected from the Khmer Rouge in December 1998,31 Hun Sen declared
they should be welcomed ‘with bouquets of flowers, not with prisons and
handcuffs’.32 He added: ‘We should dig a hole and bury the past and look
ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate.’33
Noting that Hun Sen’s support for a tribunal faded upon the December defections and the March 1999 arrest of Ta Mok, the last remaining senior DK official
still at large, Hammarberg surmised: ‘It appears that the tribunal had been considered as a means of defeating the Khmer Rouge [as a military force]. When this
goal now had been achieved through other means, there was no need to try
anyone else than the one person who had refused to surrender: Ta Mok.’34
But the Cambodian leader faced an increasingly powerful demand for justice,
which he could hardly ignore.35 By August 1999, his government and the UN
were negotiating the details of a Khmer Rouge tribunal.

622

JICJ 18 (2020), 615–640

36 Group of Experts Report, supra note 2, § 133.
37 Ibid., § 139.
38 See Report of the Secretary-General: Situation of human rights in Cambodia, UN Doc. A/54/353, 20
September 1999, § 55. Cambodia’s agreement would not have been legally necessary if the UN
Security Council established a tribunal. But China, which had long supported the Khmer
Rouge, blocked this path. See Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 3, 5.
39 See Gidley, supra note 11, at 91; J.D. Ciorciari and A. Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (The University of Michigan Press, 2014), at 184. The UN
put forth such a proposal in August 1999. See P. Shenon, ‘U.N. Plans Joint War Crimes
Tribunal for Khmer Rouge’, New York Times, 12 August 1999.
40 Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 18.
41 See e.g. Etcheson, supra note 3, at 63 et seq.; Gidley, supra note 11, at 90–107; Hammarberg,
supra note 11; C. Etcheson, ‘A ‘Fair and Public Trial’: A Political History of the Extraordinary
Chambers’, in Open Society Justice Initiative (ed.), Just. Initiatives: The Extraordinary Chambers
(Open Society Institute, 2006) 7; Chhang, supra note 14, at 162–168.
42 See Heder and Tittemore, supra note 5, at 16.
43 See ibid., at 16 note 42; Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 18–19; B. Adams, ‘No Pass for the
Khmer Rouge’ (opinion piece), Washington Post, 18 April 2000.
44 Corell explained that, based on negotiations up to that point, the UN had ‘come to the conclusion that the Extraordinary Chambers, as currently envisaged, would not guarantee the
independence, impartiality and objectivity that a court established with the support of the
United Nations must have’. Statement by UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell at a press briefing
at UN Headquarters in New York, 8 February 2002.
45 Chhang, supra note 14, at 165. See also Y. Chhang, ‘Cambodia Won’t Easily Find Justice on Its
Own’ (opinion piece), New York Times, 14 February 2002; S. Mydans, ‘Khmer Rouge Trials Won’t
Be Fair, Critics Say’, New York Times, 10 February 2002; ‘Rights Groups Ask Government, UN to
Open Credible Khmer Rouge Tribunal’, Agence France-Presse, 9 December 2002.
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judicial actors ‘to be immune from such pressure’ in a court organized under
Cambodian law.36 Accordingly, the experts ‘strongly’ recommended that the
UN create an ad hoc international tribunal,37 an approach also favoured by
the UN’s lead negotiator, then-UN Legal Advisor Hans Corell.
Hun Sen quickly rejected this model.38 With an international court off the
table, UN negotiators believed the only way to shield a Khmer Rouge tribunal
from political interference was for the UN to appoint a majority of judges and
the chief prosecutor.39 Yet this, too, was anathema to Hun Sen, who never
wavered from the position he conveyed to Hammarberg in October 1999:
‘Cambodia wants to be given opportunity to be masters of its own situation.
You can participate, but do not try to be masters of the issue.’40
How the two sides ultimately agreed to create the ECCC has been described
in depth elsewhere.41 Here it will suffice to note five factors that, in combination, led the UN to support a court about which its senior officials had grave
doubts and Hun Sen to accept a court he was hardly keen to create.
First, an emergent civil society in Cambodia supported international pressure
on the Cambodian government42 and made its views known.43 When, for
example, Corell announced in February 2002 that the UN had withdrawn
from negotiations,44 ‘[p]rotests and demands to restart negotiations poured
in from genocide victims at home and abroad, and received ample coverage
in the media’.45 Although Cambodian citizens did not play a formal role in
negotiations, their views bolstered the position of key participants.
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46 The US government periodically injected itself into negotiations; at several points, US interventions defined key features of the ECCC structure. For examples, see Etcheson, supra note 3, at
61, 75–76.
47 GA Res. 57/228A, UN Doc. A/RES/57/228, 18 December 2002, § 1.
48 Heder and Tittemore, supra note 5, at 16. Hun Sen was more likely to make concessions in
response to pressure from foreign governments, on whose support Cambodia depended for
crucial aid, than from the UN. See Gidley, supra note 11, at 91.
49 Participating NGOs at times took divergent positions. While all were firmly committed to
ensuring accountability, judicial independence and fair process, some were disposed to call
for an end to negotiations when it seemed a flawed tribunal would result, while others were
more inclined to press for negotiated solutions to challenges.
50 A notable intervention took place on 15 October 2002, when the Open Society Institute convened a meeting, chaired by Aryeh Neier, among representatives of seven key UN member
states, Thomas Hammarberg, and five NGO representatives, including the author, to strategize
about how to persuade the UN to resume negotiations, which had ended eight months earlier.
51 See A. Sipress, ‘For Torture Camp Survivor, Time is Scarce; Chance to Bear Witness against
Khmer Rouge Hinges on Stalled Tribunal’, Washington Post, 18 February 2003; S. Mydans,
‘Flawed Khmer Rouge Trial Better than None’, New York Times, 16 April 2003; P. Shenon,
‘U.N. Plans Joint War Crimes Tribunal for Khmer Rouge’, New York Times, 12 August 1999.
One individual who might have been charged before the ECCC, Kae Pok, died in 2002.
52 E-mail from Payam Akhavan, 26 July 2019. Akhavan, a former prosecutor at the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, had become engaged in efforts to broker a compromise between Cambodia and the
UN.
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Secondly, influential states pressed the UN to conclude an agreement with
Cambodia. While the US role was especially visible,46 other states pushed the
UN to find a way forward when negotiations stalled. For example, after the UN
withdrew from negotiations in February 2002, France and Japan co-sponsored
a resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2002, calling
for the Secretary-General to resume talks.47
Thirdly, despite his tepid support for prosecutions, Hun Sen believed he had
to ‘make at least some accommodation to rising international pressures for a
credible accounting’.48
Fourth, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helped shape
the course of negotiations, often amplifying the concerns of Cambodian civil
society. Throughout the planning process, the Open Society Justice Initiative
(OSJI) convened NGO meetings to strategize about difficult issues as they arose
in negotiations.49 These NGOs were influential; some marshalled pressure to
revive negotiations after they broke off.50
Finally, and of overarching importance, a looming prospect animated
Cambodian survivors and others who pressed the UN to persevere in the
face of vexing challenges: the chance to prosecute any Khmer Rouge leaders
might soon end.51 One individual who sought to facilitate negotiations made
the point this way: ‘I was under the impression that this was the only chance
to bring any of the Khmer Rouge to justice, and that the failure of a compromise solution would result in complete impunity.’52
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B. Who Could Be Prosecuted, Who Would Decide

C. The Devil in the Details: The Supermajority Formula and the ‘Co’s’
As noted, with an international tribunal ruled out, UN negotiators believed
judicial independence could be assured only if the UN appointed a majority of
judges, as Cambodian judges would be more vulnerable to pressure from their
government. Yet this was unacceptable to Hun Sen. A concept developed by
Scheffer bridged their positions: a simple majority of each chamber would be
Cambodian judges while the rest would be selected by the UN, but certain
crucial decisions would require the support of a supermajority — that is, a
simple majority plus at least one more judge.55 In Scheffer’s reasoning, requiring that at least one international judge vote for key decisions would ensure
that none resulted (solely) from government pressure.
Scheffer also devised a way to address the risk that a Cambodian prosecutor
and investigating judge would block prosecutions disfavoured by Hun Sen:
‘[t]here . . . would be an international coprosecutor and international coinvestigating judge’ working alongside Cambodian counterparts.56 If the coprosecutors or co-investigating judges disagreed about whether to open an
53 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, signed 6 June 2003 (entered into force 29 April 2005) (hereafter the
‘Agreement’), Arts 1, 2(1), 5(3), 6(3); Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, 10 August 2001, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on
27 October 2004 (hereafter the ‘ECCC Law’), Arts 1, 2.
54 See Heder, supra note 6, at 17.
55 See Scheffer, supra note 20, at 387–388; B. Crossette, ‘U.S. Seeks to Break Impasse Blocking
Khmer Rouge Trials’, New York Times, 20 October 1999. In the agreement ultimately reached,
the international judges are nominated by the UN Secretary-General and appointed by the
Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy. Agreement, supra note 53, Art. 3.
56 Scheffer, supra note 20, at 388.
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The UN would insist on guarantees of independence and due process for any
tribunal it co-sponsored. But in its negotiations with Cambodia, its demands
were driven by a specific preoccupation above all: who would determine which
Khmer Rouge figures would be tried? This issue loomed large because, as
elaborated in Section 6, there was every reason to expect Hun Sen to try to
lash the court’s selection of suspects to his political agenda.
Eventually, the UN and Cambodia reached formal agreement on language
delineating who could be tried — not only ‘senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea’, but also others ‘who were most responsible for the crimes’ of
the Khmer Rouge.53 Yet this hardly signified a shared understanding of whom
the latter phrase encompassed. For the UN, the paramount point was that the
determination must be made solely by independent court officials, not
Cambodia’s government. For Hun Sen, it would become abundantly clear,
the phrase included just one man.54
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4. Government Interference and Landmark Trials
Today, the ECCC’s defects are no longer hypothetical — though, it must be
noted, the UN addressed a number of problems that surfaced early on.62 The
Court’s bifurcated structure, with separate administration of the Cambodian
and international ‘sides’, compounded the usual inefficiencies of new war
crimes courts. Funding shortfalls have been chronic and proceedings protracted. While these and other aspects of the Court’s record have shaped its
legacy, this section is concerned solely with the challenge highlighted in previous sections — the ECCC’s ability to resist political pressure concerning
targets of prosecution.63
57 Under the ECCC’s complex procedure, the Co-Prosecutors conduct a preliminary investigation to
determine whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction were committed and identify potential
suspects and witnesses. If they believe such crimes were committed, they can file a submission
to the Co-Investigating Judges, who conduct their own investigations within the parameters of
that submission.
58 Scheffer, supra note 20, at 396–397. For a qualitative analysis of the purported dysfunctions of
the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber, in particular with regard to Cases 003 and 004, see in this
symposium, N. Naidu and S. Williams, ‘The Function and Dysfunction of the Pre-Trial
Chamber at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’.
59 See e.g. Agreement, Art. 7.4; ECCC Law, Arts 20, 23, both supra note 53. When the UN
Secretary-General submitted the draft agreement establishing the ECCC for the General
Assembly’s approval, he registered his discomfort with ‘the problematic "supermajority" formula, which was introduced into the negotiations by member States, and not by the United
Nations’. Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, UN Doc. A/57/769, 31 March
2003, § 30.
60 See supra note 53. The Agreement had to be approved by the Cambodian National Assembly
and UN General Assembly before it became effective. Supplementary agreements were concluded in mid-March 2006. UN News Center, UN and Cambodia Sign Key Agreements Ahead of
Khmer Rouge Trials, 14 March 2006.
61 ‘Judges Sworn in for Khmer Rouge Trials’, International Herald Tribune, 3 July 2006.
62 For example, irregularities in Cambodian hiring practices prompted a UN audit. See Audit of
Human Resources Management at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, United
Nations Development Programme, Office of Audit and Performance Review, Report No.
RCM0172, 4 June 2007, available online at http://old.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/OAPR.pdf
(visited 25 April 2020), at 18–19.
63 Even with respect to this topic space constraints preclude a comprehensive assessment. For
detailed discussions of ECCC rulings on challenges to judicial independence, including in respect
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investigation or indict a suspect,57 the investigation or indictment would proceed unless a supermajority of Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) judges voted to block
it.58 Although UN negotiators opposed this approach, ultimately both parties
agreed to incorporate it in the ECCC’s legal framework.59
In March 2003, the two sides initialled and in June 2003 signed a framework agreement to govern the ECCC, which is also governed by a 2004
Cambodian law establishing the Court.60 After further delays, judges were
sworn in on 3 July 2006.61 Less than three weeks later, a leading candidate
for prosecution, Ta Mok, died, reviving the spectre that had shadowed negotiations: justice so long delayed would become justice denied.
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A. Testing the ECCC’s Independence: Cases 003 and 004

64
65
66
67

68
69
70

of case selection, see N.H.B. Jørgensen, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), at 178–186, 372; S.M. Torrens, ‘Allegations of Political
Interference, Bias and Corruption at the ECCC’, in S.M. Meisenberg and I. Stegmiller (eds),
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Springer, 2016) 45–75.
S. Mydans, ‘Prosecutors Identify Suspects in Khmer Rouge Trial’, New York Times, 19 July
2007, quoting Youk Chhang.
See Etcheson, supra note 3, at 222–224.
Ciociari and Heindel, supra note 39, at 176, quoting a US Embassy cable dated 1 September
2009.
See B. Brady, ‘No More KR Suspects: Cambodian Prosecutor’, Phnom Penh Post, 6 January
2009. In November 2008, Petit sought Chea Leang’s signature on three submissions. One
named Sou Met and Meas Muth, both Khmer Rouge military leaders, as suspects in Case
003. A second submission named Ao An, Yim Tith, and Im Chaem in Case 004. A
Supplementary Submission in Case 002 named Van Rith, whose inclusion in the CoProsecutors’ first Introductory Submission had been opposed by Chea Leang. The last submission was later withdrawn when the International Co-Prosecutor learned Van Rith had died in
November 2008. See Annex I: Public Redacted Version, Considerations of the Pre-Trial
Chamber Regarding the Disagreement Between the Co-Prosecutors Pursuant to Internal Rule
71, 001/18-11-2008-ECCC-PT, 18 August 2009 (hereafter ‘PTC Considerations’), § 6.
S. Mydans, ‘Efforts to Limit Khmer Rouge Trials Decried’, New York Times, 1 February 2009.
See PTC Considerations, supra note 67, § 1.
E. Madra, ‘Cambodia PM Rejects Wider Khmer Rouge Trials’, Reuters, 31 March 2009.
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A decade after Pol Pot’s capture catalysed urgent efforts to establish a Khmer
Rouge tribunal, the ECCC Co-Prosecutors submitted the names of five suspects
to the Co-Investigating Judges, who would decide whether to bring charges
after conducting further investigations themselves. This was, in the words of a
prominent Cambodian civil society leader, ‘the moment the victims have been
waiting for[,] a turning point toward justice’.64
The submission provided an early but limited test of the ECCC’s ability to
resist political pressure. International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit had sought to
include one suspect who had not been ‘approved’ by the government. The day
before the submission was filed, the National Co-Prosecutor, Chea Leang,
declined to approve that suspect’s inclusion. Eager to avoid delay, Petit deleted
him from the submission.65
The following year, Petit threw down the proverbial gauntlet, seeking investigations against six suspects who had been ‘among the most brutal implementers’ of DK policies,66 but whose prosecution was not sanctioned by Hun
Sen. Chea Leang declined to join Petit,67 citing ‘reasons that appear[ed] to
reflect the government’s position’.68 In late 2008, Petit filed a notice of disagreement with the Court’s PTC.69 Hun Sen left no doubt where he stood; in
March 2009, he publicly warned that any cases beyond those against the
original five suspects could revive armed conflict, adding: ‘I would prefer to
see this tribunal fail instead of seeing war return to my country.’70
In its first test, the Court’s dispute-resolution process functioned much as
Scheffer anticipated. All three national judges voted against the investigations
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71 PTC Considerations, supra note 67.
72 Eventually, Lemonde proceeded without You. For details of this episode, see Ciociari and
Heindel, supra note 39, at 178–179.
73 See Etcheson, supra note 3, at 296.
74 See L. Crothers and P. Bopha, ‘War Crimes Suspect Sou Met Dead’, Cambodia Daily, 27 June
2013.
75 See ECCC Press Release, Co-Investigating Judges, 29 April 2011.
76 Etcheson, supra note 3, at 299. See also D. Gillison, ‘Justice Denied’, Foreign Policy, 23
November 2011 (in a message seeking the UN Secretary-General’s guidance on how to proceed, UN legal officers working in the office of the Co-Investigating Judges said that, in their
view, the two judges ‘did not conduct a genuine, impartial or effective investigation’).
77 Gillison, supra note 76.
78 S. Mydans, Judge Quits Tribunal in Khmer Rouge Inquiry, New York Times, 11 October 2011.
Media accounts suggest, however, that Blunk’s resignation was prompted in large part by the
fact that he was now under investigation himself for improper actions. See Gillison, supra note
76.
79 Ciociari and Heindel, supra note 39, at 181 (quoting Council of Ministers spokesman Phay
Siphan).
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while both international judges supported them.71 Pursuant to the supermajority formula, investigations were allowed to proceed in what became Cases 003
and 004.
But this is not to say safeguards against political interference have been
successful. While they have enabled investigations in Cases 003 and 004 to
proceed despite Cambodian opposition, national participants in the ECCC have
found myriad ways to hinder these cases. For example, precious time was lost
as the National Co-Investigating Judge, You Bunleng, delayed authorising
crime base investigations desired by his international counterpart, Marcel
Lemonde, in Cases 003 and 00472 (though, it should be noted, Lemonde
himself prioritized work on Case 002).73 In light of the advanced age of
Khmer Rouge suspects, such delays can defeat justice just as surely as rulings
that bend to political pressure. Indeed, one of the suspects in Case 003 died in
2013.74
Moreover, the supermajority procedure simply did not address a problem
that materialized soon after Lemonde resigned. In April 2011, his successor,
Siegfried Blunk, joined with Judge You to close Case 003.75 To be sure, in
principle a joint decision to end a case could be taken fairly, independently,
and impartially even if it happens to align with the government’s wishes. Here,
however, there were ample grounds to doubt the integrity of the CoInvestigating Judges’ decision, which was taken after ‘hardly any investigation
at all’76 and has been aptly described as ‘a crude attempt to whitewash five
suspects accused in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people’.77
Several months later, Blunk announced that he was resigning because the
government’s attempted interference might lead people to question his independence.78 As if to underscore the premise of his account, a government
spokesman, commenting on Blunk’s departure, said: ‘We still stand on our
ground regarding the ECCC. There will be no case 003 or 004.’79
Blunk’s designated successor, reserve International Co-Investigating Judge
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, was determined to conduct a robust investigation
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80 Kasper-Ansermet issued a blistering account of obstruction of his work. Note of the
International Reserve Co-Investigating Judge to the Parties on the Egregious Dysfunctions
within the ECCC Impeding the Proper Conduct of Investigations in Cases 003 and 004,
(Cases 003 and 004), D114, 21 March 2012.
81 Etcheson, supra note 3, at 309–310.
82 Agreement, supra note 53, Art. 5(6) (the reserve Co-Investigating Judge shall replace the sitting
Co-Investigating Judge in case of a ‘vacancy’ or ‘need to fill the post’).
83 OSJI, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, No. 26,
February 2012.
84 Kasper-Ansermet’s stormy tenure is described in Etcheson, supra note 3, at 304–312.
85 Ibid. at 322.
86 See S. White, ‘Another KRT Judge Exits’, Phnom Penh Post, 8 July 2015; see also J. Hammer,
‘The Very Tricky Trial of the Khmer Rouge’, New York Review of Books, 21 May 2015, 42, at
42. Harmon’s successor later expanded the charges against Ao An. See A. Marazzi Sasson,
‘New Charges Brought against Ta An at KRT’, Phnom Penh Post, 15 March 2016.
87 See Etcheson, supra note 3, at 326. Harmon did, however, persuade Ao An to appear in court,
where he was advised of the charges against him. Later, Harmon’s successor arranged to read
charges to Meas Muth and Yim Tith. See ibid. at 327.
88 See ibid., at 325–326.
89 See ECCC Press Release, ‘Statement of International Co-Investigating Judge regarding Case
004’, 9 December 2015. On 28 June 2019, the Co-Investigating Judges filed opposing closing
orders in this case, with Bohlander finding sufficient grounds to commit Yim Tith to trial while
dismissing certain charges. Closing Order, Yim Tith (Case 004), D382, International CoInvestigating Judge, 28 June 2019. Bohlander and You later issued opposing orders in the
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in Cases 003 and 004. But You flatly refused to cooperate with him, and the
Supreme Council of the Magistracy refused to formally approve KasperAnsermet. Unable to perform his functions, the Swiss jurist resigned.80
Before this happened, the UN lodged an ‘uncharacteristically direct’ protest,81 and justifiably so: under the governing legal framework, KasperAnsermet should have automatically succeeded Blunk.82 Yet KasperAnsermet was a flawed standard-bearer for the principles imperilled by his
treatment. An avid and ‘imprudent’83 social-media user, he had retweeted
highly critical accounts of developments at the ECCC before he arrived in
Cambodia. Once there, he took a number of provocative actions.84 Arguably,
then, the tenures of his two immediate successors, who worked in a relatively
collaborative fashion with Cambodian personnel, offer a more instructive basis
for assessing the ECCC’s ability to withstand political pressure.
By some measures Mark Harmon, a highly respected former prosecutor at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) who
succeeded Kasper-Ansermet, enjoyed ‘a remarkably productive tenure’.85
Despite the formal opposition of Judge You, Harmon conducted a serious investigation in Cases 003 and 004 and brought charges against the surviving
suspect in the former, Meas Muth, and two of three suspects in the latter, Im
Cheam and Ao An.86 Yet, in notable contrast to the detention of suspects in
Cases 001 and 002, none of these individuals was taken into custody despite
multiple judicial orders requiring their arrests;87 instead, government officials
openly defied the orders.88
Harmon’s immediate successor, Michael Bohlander, brought charges against
the remaining suspect in Case 004, Yim Tith, in December 2015.89 Against
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B. Landmark Trials and Judgments
How to assess a deeply flawed institution that nonetheless rendered historic
justice presents challenges for which there are no generally accepted metrics.
Yet that is precisely the paradox presented by the ECCC’s record. Alongside the

90
91
92

93

94

case of Ao An. ECCC Press Release: ‘Co-Investigating Judges Issue Two Separate Closing Orders
in Case Against Ao An Case No. 004/2/07-09-2009-ECCC/OCIJ’, available online at www.eccc.
gov.kh/en/articles/co-investigating-judges-issue-two-separate-closing-orders-case-against-aocase-no-004207 (visited 16 August 2019).
Etcheson, supra note 3, at 327.
Judge Bohlander rescinded previous arrest orders against Meas Muth. See ibid.
Jørgensen, supra note 63, at 173. With Bohlander’s concurrence, moreover, the case against
one of the suspects in Case 004, Im Chaem, has been finally dismissed. Closing Order (Reasons),
Im Chaem (Case 004/1), D308/3, 10 July 2017. The Co-Investigating Judges’ reasoning has
been sharply questioned. See e.g. Etcheson, supra note 3, at 329.
These legal challenges are described in detail in Jørgensen, supra note 63, and Torrens, supra
note 63. Such challenges have been lodged against international as well as national judges. For
an overall appraisal of whether suspects’ rights were upheld during the ECCC investigative
stage, see in this symposium, G. Sluiter and M. Tiernan, ‘The Right to an Effective Defence
During ECCC Investigations’.
Torrens, supra note 63, at 70. See also H. Ryan and L. McGrew, Performance and Perception: The
Impact of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, OSJI, available online at www.
justiceinitiative.org/publications/performance-and-perception-impact-extraordinary-chamberscourt-cambodia (visited 9 May 2020), (hereafter ‘OSJI, Performance and Perceptions’), at 39. This
is not to suggest judicial self-interest alone accounts for ECCC rulings dismissing motions
alleging bias. Evidence submitted by defence counsel has not always been sufficient to meet
the standard applicable to disqualification and other motions.
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the government’s consistent opposition to Cases 003 and 004, this arguably
marked ‘a significant milestone in [ECCC] history[,] . . . the first time all of the
accused in [Cases 003 and 004] had formally become charged persons’.90
Even so, it would require an excess of optimism to believe the surviving
suspects in Cases 003 and 004 will face trial. At this writing (February
2020), none of the individuals charged by Harmon or Bohlander has been
arrested,91 much less brought to trial. In larger perspective, the supermajority
requirement has often operated in such a way that ‘a genuine deadlock between national and international actors simply endures with potentially serious consequences for the legitimacy of the [ECCC]’.92
It remains to be noted that ECCC judicial panels have repeatedly ruled
against defence motions alleging political interference as well as other sources
of judicial bias.93 This pattern raises the question whether defendants’ allegations concerning the effects of government interference were indeed without
merit. Here, it must suffice to note that this implication does not follow from
the outcome of defence challenges. It is instead quite possible that rulings
dismissing these challenges reflect, at least in part, ECCC judges’ inclination
to ‘shield[] themselves from criticism directed towards their integrity’ and that
they ‘are also protecting the Court from similar scrutiny’.94
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1. Case 001: The Trial of Duch
If a regime can be understood by the institutions it creates, Democratic Kampuchea should
be remembered through Tuol Sleng.100

On 30 March 2009 — three decades after the DK regime was ousted from
power and one decade after the UN and Cambodia began negotiations over a
Khmer Rouge tribunal — the first ECCC trial began in the case against
Duch.101 By then, the Court’s integrity had been placed in substantial
doubt.102 Yet the opening of its first trial was undeniably a ‘momentous’

95 See supra text accompanying note 64.
96 Already in military detention since his 1999 arrest, Duch was placed in provisional detention
on 31 July 2007 based on an order of the Co-Investigating Judges. His August 2008 indictment was confirmed and amended by the ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber on 5 December 2008.
See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Case 001, available online at www.
eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/90 (visited 25 April 2020).
97 The last four were indicted in mid-September 2010. See S. Mydans, ‘Four Khmer Rouge
Leaders Are Indicted’, New York Times, 17 September 2010.
98 To be sure, the Court’s limited jurisdiction has been questioned on various grounds unrelated
to the issue explored here. See e.g. R. Killean, Victims, Atrocity and International Criminal
Justice: Lessons from Cambodia (Routledge, 2018) 49, 53.
99 There is, nonetheless, room for differing views about who were the most culpable surviving
Khmer Rouge; Ieng Thirith did not make some experts’ short list of leading candidates for
prosecution. See e.g. Heder and Tittemore, supra note 5.
100 Becker, supra note 3, at 261.
101 The trial officially opened on 17 February 2009, but the hearing that began that day was
devoted to procedural issues. See S. Mydans, ‘First on Cambodia’s Docket: A Man Whose Jail
Sent 14,000 to a Killing Field’, New York Times, 17 February 2009.
102 The dispute between the first International Co-Prosecutor and his Cambodian counterpart
over Cases 003 and 004 discussed in the previous section had recently been in the news,
and allegations of corruption involving Cambodian participants in the ECCC had received
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problems highlighted in previous sections, the ECCC conducted three historic
trials resulting in landmark judgments.
These cases were triggered in July 2007, when the Co-Prosecutors submitted
to the Co-Investigating Judges the names of five suspects:95 Kaing Guek Eav
(‘Duch’),96 head of the notorious S-21 interrogation facility who in Case 001
became the first defendant to go to trial; Ieng Sary, DK Foreign Minister; Ieng
Thirith, DK Minister of Social Affairs; Nuon Chea, Deputy Secretary of the CPK
Central Committee; and Khieu Samphân, DK Head of State.97 The last four
became co-defendants in Case 002.
A crucial point to be made is that, had the UN determined it could fund the
prosecution of five individuals, there would have been scant grounds to question the selection of these five.98 This is not to say the Cambodian government’s interference in case selection is irrelevant in assessing these cases, as I
discuss later. The point instead is that an independent, impartial prosecutor or
investigating judge reasonably could have determined these individuals merited
prosecution, and surely would have selected most of them.99
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103
104

105

106
107
108
109

110
111

substantial attention. See e.g. J.A. Hall, ‘Yet Another U.N. Scandal’ (opinion piece), Wall Street
Journal, 21 September 2007.
T. Johnston, ‘Trial of Khmer Rouge Boss Opens’, Washington Post, 31 March 2009.
The ECCC’s governing laws do not authoritatively define ‘senior leaders’ but the phrase is
widely understood to include members of the CPK’s Standing Committee and its subordinate
Central Committee. See Heder, supra note 6, at 28, 41. But see Appeal Judgment, Kaing Guek
Eav alias Duch (Case 001), F28, Supreme Court Chamber, 3 February 2012 (hereafter Case
001 Appeal Judgment), § 76 (noting in dictum that ‘the term "senior leaders" is sufficiently
flexible that it may not necessarily be limited to former members of the CPK Central and/or
Standing Committees’).
See Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case 001), E188, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010
(hereafter Case 001 Trial Judgment), § 340 (no fewer than 12,272 detainees in S-21 were
executed) and note 619 (‘with very few exceptions’, those detained in S-21 were executed).
S. Mydans, ‘Khmer Rouge Defendant Apologizes for Atrocities’, New York Times, 1 April 2009.
S. Scully, ‘Judging the Successes and Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers of [sic] the Courts
of Cambodia’, 13 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal (2011) 300–353, at 340.
Gidley, supra note 11, at 178.
E. Stover, M. Balthazard and K.A. Koenig, ‘Confronting Duch: Civil Party Participation in Case
001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 93 International Review of the
Red Cross (2011) 503–546, at 536.
Case 001 Trial Judgment, supra note 105.
Ibid., §§ 631, 679. The Trial Chamber determined that five years should be subtracted from
this sentence because Duch was detained unlawfully before his transfer to ECCC custody, and
that he was entitled to credit against his remaining sentence for time detained pending trial
and judgment. Case 001 Trial Judgment, supra note 105, §§ 627, 632–633, 680–681.
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occasion.103 Although Duch was never a ‘senior leader’ of the Khmer
Rouge,104 few individuals more fully personified its brutality. Thousands
detained in the torture centre run by Duch, S-21 (also known as Toul
Sleng), were tortured before all but a handful were executed.105
Even before judgment, proceedings in Case 001 delivered a palpable measure of justice. Duch’s expression of remorse at the outset of his trial
‘addressed a deep need among victims’, according to a lawyer representing
civil parties.106 During his trial, Duch spoke expansively about atrocities in
S-21, providing at least partial answers to questions that had long tormented
many Cambodians — how and why did this happen?107 As Rebecca Gidley
has noted, Cambodians’ desire ‘to understand was served better by Case 001
[than Case 002] since Duch was willing and eager to explain and respond to
witnesses’.108 Even so, some who testified in Case 001 were disappointed
when Duch failed to admit responsibility for the deaths of their loved
ones.109
On 26 July 2010, Duch was found guilty of crimes against humanity and
war crimes.110 The Trial Chamber (with one judge dissenting) imposed a sentence of 35 years.111 For Cambodians who had longed for a measure of justice,
the verdict brought a mixture of satisfaction in Duch’s conviction and disappointment — for some, distress and even outrage — in his sentence of
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35 years.112 Not surprisingly, many were pleased when Duch’s sentence was
later changed to life in prison.113

An initial hearing in the ECCC’s ‘centrepiece’114 case against four surviving
Khmer Rouge leaders began on 27 June 2011; opening statements in the trial
proper began in November 2011. The head of a Cambodian human rights
organization, Ou Virak, hailed the former as ‘cathartic . . . for all
Cambodians’.115
Yet many worried about the ‘age and ill health of the defendants’, who then
ranged from 79 to 85 years old.116 The spectre of former Serbian leader
Slobodan Milošević loomed over proceedings; what was meant to be the capstone trial before the ICTY ended abruptly when Milošević died shortly before
his years-long trial was set to conclude.117 And indeed, proceedings against
Ieng Sary ended 16 months after his trial began when he died before judgment.118 Proceedings against another defendant, Ieng Thirith, were terminated
just before opening statements because she suffered from dementia.119
In light of the breadth of the charges in Case 002 and fears that defendants
might not survive a trial of such sweep, the Trial Chamber had already split
the case into two trials.120 On 7 August 2014, the Trial Chamber issued its
judgment in Case 002/01, convicting surviving defendants Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphân of crimes against humanity and sentencing them to life

112 See Stover, Balthazard, and Koenig, supra note 109, at 538–541; Ciociari and Heindel, supra
note 39, at 130; OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 80–81. Compare N.
Stammel et al., The Survivors’ Voices: Attitudes on the ECCC, the Former Khmer Rouge and
Experiences with Civil Party Participation (Center for the Treatment of Torture Victims,
2010), at 48 (reporting relatively high levels of satisfaction with the sentence imposed at
trial among surveyed civil parties).
113 Case 001 Appeal Judgment, supra note 104, § 383. See Ciociari and Heindel, supra note 39, at
132. International NGOs criticized the Supreme Court Chamber for overturning the Trial
Chamber’s reduction of Duch’s sentence by five years to remedy his unlawful detention pending trial. See ‘Khmer Rouge Chief Jailer Given Life Sentence’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2012;
OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 22.
114 S. Mydans, ‘Ex-Khmer Rouge Leaders Go on Trial in Cambodia’, New York Times, 27 June
2011.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 See D. Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford
University Press, 2018), 154.
118 Termination of the Proceedings against the Accused IENG Sary, Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002),
E270/1, Trial Chamber, 14 March 2013.
119 Decision on Immediate Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Order to Unconditionally Release
the Accused IENG Thirith, Nuon Chea et al. (Case 002), E138/1/10/1/5/7, Supreme Court
Chamber, 14 December 2012. Ieng Thirith died in August 2015.
120 Severance Order Pursuant to Internal Rule 89ter, 22 September 2011. For a detailed account
of legal challenges to this and later severance orders in Case 002, see Jørgensen, supra note
63, at 161 et seq.
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121 Judgment, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphân (Case 002/01), E313, Trial Chamber, 7 August
2014. Case 002/01 covered crimes accompanying two population transfers, including the
evacuation of at least two million people from Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975, as well as the
execution in Tuol Po Chrey of hundreds of officials who had served in the government that fell
to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. In November 2016, the Supreme Court Chamber reversed
several of the trial convictions but affirmed the two defendants’ life sentences. Appeal
Judgment, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphân (Case 002/01), F36, Supreme Court Chamber, 23
November 2016 (hereafter ‘Case 002/01 Appeal Judgment’).
122 OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 24.
123 T. Fawthrop, ‘Despite the Controversy, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Is a Success’, Interpreter, 19
January 2018.
124 Judgment, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphân (Case 002/02), E465, Trial Chamber, 16 November
2018 (hereafter ‘Case 002/02 Trial Judgment’) (full reasons issued on 28 March 2019). The
trial ran from 17 October 2014 to 11 January 2017.
125 See S. Mydans, ‘2 Aging Khmer Rouge Leaders Are Found Guilty of Genocide’, New York
Times, 17 November 2019.
126 Case 002/02 Trial Judgment, supra note 124, §§ 4401–4402.
127 H. Ellis-Petersen, ‘Khmer Rouge Leaders Found Guilty of Genocide in Cambodia’s "Nuremberg"
Moment’, Guardian, 16 November 2018. The main legal developments relating to the Case
002/02 Trial Judgment are addressed, in this symposium, by E. Fry and E. van Sliedregt,
‘Targeted Groups, Rape, and Dolus Eventualis: Assessing the ECCC’s Contributions to
Substantive International Criminal Law’.
128 ‘Khmer Rouge Leaders Found Guilty of Genocide in Landmark Ruling’, Agence France-Presse,
16 November 2018. While fewer studies have documented Cambodian views of this trial than
earlier trials, media reports suggest it provided significant satisfaction to some victims. See e.g.
ibid. (quoting Los Sat, an ethnic Cham, saying ‘I am really satisfied with the sentences’), while
others expressed more sober reactions. See e.g. H. Beech, ‘Khmer Rouge’s Slaughter in
Cambodia Is Ruled a Genocide’, New York Times, 15 November 2018 (quoting one survivor
saying ‘[i]t may be finished, but I won’t ever have peace’).
129 Ibid.
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imprisonment.121 Many Cambodians ‘expressed a feeling of relief and satisfaction, as well as a sense of closure’.122 When the verdict was announced, a
group of ten victims said: ‘We will finally be able to mourn our relatives. It was
important for us to see those who planned and ordered these crimes to be held
to account.’123
The trial in Case 002/02 — the ECCC’s capstone case, albeit with a diminished dock of elderly suspects — covered crimes representing the hellish arc of
the DK era. On 16 November 2018, the Trial Chamber delivered its judgment,
which found Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphân guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in relation to ethnic Vietnamese, and also found
Nuon Chea guilty of genocide in relation to ethnic Cham.124 Once again, the
two men, by then aged 87 and 92,125 received sentences of life
imprisonment.126
The ruling was widely seen as a ‘landmark moment’ for the ECCC.127 Youk
Chhang hailed the verdict, which in his words ‘affirm[ed] the collective humanity of the victims and [gave] recognition to the horrible suffering’.128 In
the view of David Scheffer, who had pushed relentlessly for the Court’s creation, the ruling proved the ECCC had been ‘worth the money and effort’ its
extended operation had entailed.129
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On 4 August 2019, Nuon Chea died at the age of 93.130 Unrepentant to his
last days, Pol Pot’s second-in-command died convicted of the most serious
crimes in the code of humanity.131

The ECCC has not substantially achieved many goals widely associated with
transitional justice, such as strengthening the rule of law.132 Yet it has meaningfully advanced one that is of fundamental importance — answering victims’
demand for justice.
This section proceeds from the premise that victims’ experience of justice is a
key benchmark for assessing the ECCC’s achievements.133 This approach is
grounded in two considerations. First, as noted earlier, Cambodian survivors’
demand for justice provided crucial impetus for the ECCC’s creation. Secondly,
while myriad goals have been ascribed to war crimes courts, recent experience
suggests they are well suited to achieve one in particular: satisfying survivors’
desire for justice.134
At the heart of this desire is an almost universal need on the part of victims
of atrocious crimes for ‘recognition of the fact that they have been harmed’
and that they were wronged.135 This general observation is surely relevant in
Cambodia, where vast numbers suffered grievous harm during the DK period.
Four-fifths of Cambodians who participated in a Fall 2008 survey, all of whom
were adults when surveyed, considered themselves victims of the Khmer
Rouge.136 While justice for DK-era atrocities was not the highest priority of
130 W. Branigan, ‘Khmer Rouge’s "Brother Number Two", Main Operator of Killing Machine’
(obituary), Washington Post, 6 August 2019; S. Mydans, ‘Nuon Chea, 93, Khmer Rouge
Deputy Behind Cambodian Genocide, Is Dead (obituary)’, New York Times, 5 August 2019.
131 Although an appeal lodged by Nuon Chea was pending at the time of his death, the Supreme
Court Chamber ruled that the trial judgment in Case 002/02 was not therefore vacated.
Decision on Urgent Request concerning the Impact on Appeal Proceedings of Nuon Chea’s
Death prior to the Appeal Judgment, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphân (Case 002/02), F46/2/4/2,
Supreme Court Chamber, 22 November 2019, §§ 16, 86.i.
132 See R.C. DeFalco, ‘The Uncertain Relationship Between International Criminal Law
Accountability and the Rule of Law in Post-Atrocity States: Lessons from Cambodia’, 42
Fordham International Law Journal (2018) 1–60. Nevertheless, the ECCC’s existence and operation may have indirectly advanced the rule of law by, inter alia, intensifying local NGOs’
demands for justice outside the context of the ECCC and enhancing their capacity to monitor
Cambodian courts. See C. Sperfeldt, ‘Cambodian Civil Society and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’,
6 IJTJ (2012) 149–160; OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 53, 75.
133 Due to space constraints, however, it does not address a key dimension of that experience, the
participation of many victims as civil parties. This subject has been extensively analysed by
others. See in particular Killean, supra note 98.
134 See Orentlicher, supra note 117, at 8, 128, 189.
135 Report of the Special Rapporteur [Pablo de Greiff] on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012, § 2.
136 P. Pham et al., So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social
Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Human Rights Center,
UC Berkeley, 24 January 2009 (hereafter ‘2008 Berkeley Survey’), at 2.
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137 An overwhelming majority cited issues affecting their daily lives as a higher priority. Ibid., at
35, 45. See also N. Kirchenbauer et al., Victims Participation before the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, ADHOC, January 2013, available online at www.ziviler-friedens
dienst.org/de/publikation/baseline-study-cambodian-human-rights-and-development-associationscivil-party-scheme-case-002 (visited 9 May 2020), at 15–16 (similar findings in survey of civil
party participants in Case 002).
138 2008 Berkeley Survey, supra note 136, at 31.
139 P. Pham et al., After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of
Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Human Rights Center, UC
Berkeley, 1 June 2011 (hereafter ‘2010 Berkeley Survey’), at 19. Respondents nonetheless
overwhelmingly prioritized current concerns, such as poverty reduction. Ibid.
140 Ibid. at 29 (showing data for 2008 and 2010 Berkeley surveys). See also R. Killean,
‘Procedural Justice in International Criminal Courts: Assessing Civil Parties’ Perceptions of
Justice at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 16 International Criminal
Law Review (2016) 1–38, at 15.
141 See USAID and IRI, International Republican Institute Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion October
28–10 November 2013, 2014, at 7 (in response to survey question asking which of 10 issues
participants considered the most important ‘in continuing to push Cambodia to a free and fair
democracy’, the largest percentage selected ‘making the judiciary system fair and independent’). See also Killean, supra note 140, at 31.
142 See 2010 Berkeley Survey, supra note 139, at 26 (75% of respondents said they believe the
ECCC is neutral; 79% said they believe its judges will be fair; 83% said the ECCC should be
involved in responding to what happened during the DK era). See also Stammel et al., supra
note 112, at 52 (72% of respondents in a November–December 2010 survey of Cambodians
who had applied to be civil parties in ECCC proceedings said they believe the court acts ‘quite
a bit’ or ‘totally’ independent of political influence; two-thirds thought the ECCC would contribute to reconciliation; most others thought it would partly do so).
143 OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 71. For survivors, the desire to know what
happened is often deeply personal. A survey of civil party participants in Case 001 found that
many wanted to participate in that capacity above all so they could confront Duch about
what happened to their deceased relatives, and also in the hope he would accept responsibility
for his crimes. Stover et al., supra note 109, at 519.
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survey participants,137 just over 90% said it was important to hold accountable those responsible for Khmer Rouge depredations.138 An even higher percentage (94) of respondents in a survey conducted in December 2010
supported accountability for Khmer Rouge atrocities.139
Of course, accountability and justice can take myriad forms, and respondents
expressed a range of views about what these concepts mean. Significantly,
however, roughly three-quarters of respondents in both surveys said they
expected the ECCC to ‘bring justice’ to victims of the Khmer Rouge or their
families.140 Notably in light of Cambodian citizens’ generally low esteem for
national courts,141 a substantial majority of respondents in the 2010 survey
said they believe in the fairness and impartiality of the ECCC and its judges.142
While answering many survivors’ desire for legal justice, Cases 001 and 002
also addressed, at least in part, a prevalent desire to learn ‘the truth’ about
DK-era atrocities. Many Cambodians have said it is ‘crucial for the next generation to learn about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and who was most
responsible’.143 Responses to previously mentioned surveys confirmed a point
that has often been noted — ‘the older generation [of Cambodians] didn’t talk
to the younger generation about what happened, and [when they did] younger
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6. Making Sense of the Paradox
The ECCC represents a delicate balance of legitimacy and illegitimacy.149

If Cases 001 and 002 have gone a long way toward meeting victims’ and
other Cambodians’ expectations, this can count as a success only if trials
satisfied fundamental standards of fair process. While an assessment of trials
in light of relevant fair-trial standards is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
notable that a number of independent assessments have found, with key caveats, that ECCC trial proceedings have ‘met basic international standards of due
process’.150 Counsel for suspects have mounted robust defences; the Court’s
judgments have provided detailed discussions of evidence, assessed in light of
international jurisprudence; and the Supreme Court Chamber has reversed
certain convictions that were not adequately supported.151
Yet it is necessary to ask whether government interference, whose most
visible effect has been to thwart progress in Cases 003 and 004, leaves
room to consider any trials fundamentally sound. Or, instead, must every
144 A. Powell, ‘A Thirst for Justice Delayed’, Harvard Gazette, 9 April 2013, quoting Patrick Vinck,
one of the survey leaders. See also Scully, supra note 107, at 339.
145 2010 Berkeley Survey, supra note 139, at 31. Even so, many respondents — particularly those
who did not live under the Khmer Rouge — described their knowledge of the DK regime as
poor. Ibid.
146 See K. Hodal, ‘Khmer Rouge Survivor’s Tale Helps Cambodia Confront Its Brutal Past’,
Guardian, 24 January 2012.
147 See OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 71.
148 See e.g. Orentlicher, supra note 117, at 23–24 (many Bosnians’ high expectations for the
ICTY were followed by disappointment in its performance).
149 Gidley, supra note 11, at 9.
150 OSJI, Performance and Perception, supra note 94, at 22 (writing about Duch’s trial); ibid. at 25
(with one caveat, which relates to the issue of witness summonses discussed below, the trial in
Case 002/01 ‘generally met basic fair trial standard[s]’). See also Ciociari and Heindel, supra
note 39, at 121 (the Case 001 trial verdict showed the ECCC could ‘satisfy international legal
standards when it [was] able to exercise its authority independently’); S. Mydans, ‘Moving
Beyond Khmer Rouge’s Ghosts’, New York Times, 30 November 2009 (quoting Alex Hinton
observing that ‘Duch received the fair trial his victims never had’).
151 See e.g. Case 002/01 Appeal Judgment, supra note 121.
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people didn’t believe the older people’.144 Thus, it is notable that 57% of
respondents in a population-based survey conducted after Duch’s trial said
they knew more about what happened in the DK period after the trial than
before.145 Just as important, the ECCC’s work stimulated a wider public dialogue about the DK era than had previously taken place.146
Significantly as well, a large percentage of Cambodians surveyed after trial
verdicts were reached in Case 001 and Case 002/01 expressed support for the
ECCC.147 This is striking: high expectations of some other war crimes courts
have preceded disappointment in their work.148 While merely suggestive, sustained support for the ECCC indicates trials have meaningfully satisfied the
high expectations many Cambodians expressed before trials got underway.
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152 Baaz, supra note 16, at 331. See also Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Khmer Rouge
Convictions ‘Too Little, Too Late’, 8 August 2014.
153 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS 999,
at 171, Art. 14.
154 UN Human Rights Committee, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Comm. No. 468/1991, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990, 10 November 1993, § 9.4. See also Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 32, Article 14, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 2007.
155 Conversation with Richard Rogers, former head of ECCC Defence Support Section, 21 May
2019, Washington, DC. See also Ciociari and Heindel, supra note 39, at 193. For a positive
assessment of the supermajority rule and a suggestion that this formula could be used in
future scenarios, see in this symposium, Lobba and Pons, supra note 2.
156 The Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC has made a similar point. Case 002/01 Appeal
Judgment, supra note 121, § 126.
157 See generally B. van Schaack, ‘Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice’, 44 Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy (2017) 101–209. More affirmatively, the inclusion of local judges
can anchor the legitimacy of hybrid courts. See H. Hobbs, ‘Hybrid Tribunals and the
Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitimacy’, 16 Chicago Journal of
International Law (2016) 482–522.
158 Agreement, Art. 4(1)(a); ECCC Law, Art. 14(1)(a), both supra note 53.
159 See supra Section 4.A.
160 This is not to say the government refrained from any improper conduct in these cases. When
asked about the lengthy pre-trial detention of Duch, for example, one of the Cambodian judges
said: ‘We have approval from the government to detain him for another year.’ H. Bertelman,
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case be deemed an act in a ‘legal farce [playing] out in the outskirts of Phnom
Penh’?152 After all, major human rights treaties require that criminal suspects
be tried before an impartial and independent court,153 and a situation in which
the executive ‘is able to control or direct’ the judiciary ‘is incompatible with
the notion of [such a] tribunal’.154 As Richard Rogers suggests, moreover, the
supermajority system arguably presumes a majority of ECCC judges lacks the
probity required of every judge.155
While acknowledging the force of Rogers’ point, it should be noted that it
problematizes the hybrid model of justice generally, not just in Cambodia.156
One of the principal reasons hybrid courts have been established in myriad
countries is to ensure, through the inclusion of foreign judges working alongside national judges, that criminal proceedings are adequately insulated from
pressures to which the latter are more vulnerable without displacing local
institutions and jurists.157 Elsewhere protection from political pressure has
been assured in part by appointing a majority of international judges, at least
during a transitional period. While this is not the case with the ECCC,
the supermajority requirement for verdicts158 in principle achieves the same
effect — ensuring no defendant is convicted as a result of political pressure.
The issue raised here deserves far more substantial treatment than I can
provide in this Article. For present purposes, it must suffice to note several
further considerations that would merit attention in such an assessment.
A key question is whether, or to what degree, political interference directly
influenced Cases 001 and 002. As previously noted, concerns about interference in case selection have centred on Hun Sen’s opposition to prosecutions
beyond those cases;159 there has been scant indication he was determined to
secure prosecutions or convictions in the cases that were tried.160 To the
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161
162

163

164

165
166

‘International Standards and National Ownership? Judicial Independence in Hybrid Courts:
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 79 Nordic Journal of International Law
(2010) 341–382, at 372.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
To be sure, securing convictions in Cases 001 and 002 could burnish Hun Sen’s reputation.
Trials limited to a handful of Khmer Rouge figures could reinforce a legitimating narrative the
government has nurtured since January 1979, which draws a sharp line between senior DK
leaders who plunged Cambodia into catastrophic violence on the one hand, and lower-level
Khmer Rouge cadre like Hun Sen ‘who . . . defected and [later] returned to . . . save the
country’ on the other hand. Gidley, supra note 11, at 48. Yet this narrative was far more
important in the early years of Hun Sen’s leadership than during the life of the ECCC.
His 1997 coup against then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh was prompted in significant part by Hun Sen’s desire to disarm police and military units controlled by Ranariddh’s
political party, known by its French acronym FUNCINPEC. This, in turn, would ensure ‘that
FUNCINPEC politicians had no protection from violent threats and intimidation’ in the lead-up
to 1998 elections they were favoured to win. Heder and Orentlicher, supra note 19.
Publicly, Hun Sen made much the same point in terms that were not as self-serving. In early
March 1999, for example, he told the UN Secretary-General that, ‘if improperly and heedlessly
conducted, the trials of Khmer Rouge leaders would panic other former Khmer Rouge officers
and rank and file, who have already surrendered, into turning back to the jungle and renewing the guerrilla war’. Hammarberg, supra note 11, at 9.
See Group of Experts Report, supra note 2, § 96 (UN experts ‘have no reason to believe that the
Prime Minister would be the subject of the legal proceedings that are within our mandate’).
Hun Sen was likely involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity, even if not in the
capacity as a ‘senior leader’ or someone otherwise ‘most responsible’. See Human Rights
Watch, 30 Years of Hun Sen: Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 12 January
2015, available online at www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/30-years-hun-sen/violence-repres
sion-and-corruption-cambodia (visited 25 April 2020), at 16–17, 19–20. Hun Sen has, moreover, stated that he should be excluded from prosecution and, more generally, that the ECCC
should not prosecute former Khmer Rouge cadres who defected. See Heder, supra note 6, at
31, 37.
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contrary, Hun Sen apparently lost interest in prosecuting Khmer Rouge figures
once DK forces no longer posed a military threat, years before the ECCC was
launched.161
Brief consideration of Hun Sen’s likely motives reinforces the general inference that he was keen to exclude trials beyond Cases 001 and 002, not
affirmatively to ensure those trials took place at all or resulted in convictions
if they did.162 First, Hun Sen has long sought to ensure the loyalty to himself
of the Cambodian armed forces, the ultimate guarantor of his continued hold
on power.163 To this end, he would want to avoid raising concerns among
former Khmer Rouge soldiers now incorporated into government armed forces
that they were at risk of prosecution. Expanding prosecutions beyond his
approved list of suspects could raise precisely this concern.164
Secondly, along with other senior members of his government, Hun Sen was
a member of the Khmer Rouge until he defected to Vietnam. It is thus widely
believed he wanted to preclude any possibility, however remote,165 that he and
other members of his government face prosecution.166
Third, in the view of Cambodia scholar Stephen Heder, the government
wanted to control case selection so that it could shield individuals ‘now in
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7. Concluding Observations
Throughout fraught negotiations with Cambodia over what was then a potential
Khmer Rouge tribunal, UN negotiators faced a Hobson’s choice. Any tribunal
acceptable to the Cambodian government would fall short of UN demands. Yet
refusing to compromise would almost certainly mean one of the most murderous
regimes in recent history would evade justice. Pressed by member states and civil
society organizations, the UN assumed the very risks its negotiators preferred to
avoid, relying on the best safeguards it could secure in the circumstances.
Years later, there are grounds for opposing views about whether the UN
decision to take those risks was justified in light of the ECCC’s performance. On
one side of the ledger, the Court has been unable thus far to surmount blatant
government pressure to prevent prosecutions it opposes. On the other side,
there is scant reason to believe trials that were allowed to take place resulted
from political pressure, and independent analysts believe those trials were
conducted in a fundamentally fair fashion.
167 S. Heder, ‘The Senior Leaders and Those Most Responsible’, in OSJI (ed.), supra note 41, 53, at
54.
168 See S. Strangio and C. Sokha, ‘Govt Testimony Could Bias KRT: PM’, Phnom Penh Post, 9
October 2009. In some instances, the Co-Investigating Judges themselves declined to issue the
requested summonses; in others, witnesses summoned by the International Co-Investigating
Judge did not appear. For analysis of the legal merits of this issue, see Ciociari and Heindel,
supra note 39, at 146–151.
169 E.g. Case 002/1 Appeal Judgment, supra note 121, §§ 147–149, 158.
170 E.g. ibid., §§ 155, 158.
171 Ibid., § 100.
172 Ibid., §§ 155, 953.
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positions of authority . . . from embarrassing scrutiny in the testimony of their
former associates should the latter be prosecuted’.167 This, like the two previously noted motivations, would impel the government to limit prosecutions,
not to ensure any specific trials or convictions.
But an important caveat must be noted: much the same motivation noted
by Heder apparently lay behind improper government conduct in respect of
Case 002. Defence counsel (most insistently counsel for Nuon Chea) asked the
Co-Investigating Judges to summon several high-level officials whose testimony
the Cambodian government openly opposed168 and who were never compelled
to appear. Reviewing the Trial Chamber’s treatment of this question, the
Supreme Court Chamber identified a number of errors in the majority’s reasoning,169 but concluded that it had ‘not been established’ that the failure to
summon certain witnesses ’resulted in a ‘‘grossly unfair outcome’’’170 such as
to warrant a reversal of the judgment.171 Nevertheless, as a remedy it ‘dr[e]w
inferences’ in favour of the accused.172 Even if one finds its ruling persuasive
and its remedy sufficient, the institutional harm is not so readily dismissed. The
highly publicized confrontation over blocked witnesses injected concerns about
government interference into Case 002/01.
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173 D. Southerland, ‘Remembering Cambodia’s Brutal Brother No. 2’, Asia Times, 17 August
2019.
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For countless survivors of Khmer Rouge crimes, moreover, the justice the
ECCC delivered has been precious beyond measure. As journalist Elizabeth
Becker has noted, ‘The tribunal accomplished the critical task of bringing
justice in a country where the leaders had refused to discuss what had happened.’ Through its work, the ECCC ‘acknowledged the victims, gave dignity to
their lives, and condemned the genocidal regime’.173

